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The whole thing is about getting into holes. Putting the camera into any 
hole. 
(Gasper Noé, quoted in Adams 2010) 
 
In this essay, we provide a close textual analysis of Enter the Void (Gaspar 
Noé, France/Germany/Italy, 2009). Using concepts from the work of Gilles 
Deleuze, we argue that the film’s form reflects the narrative’s preoccupation 
with the liminal space between life and death, between subject and object, 
between inside and outside –which we characterise here as the void. Indeed, 
Enter the Void not only tells the story of a man suspended between life and 
death, but formally it also tries to depict this liminal state, to show us the void 
itself – or to bring what normally exceeds vision into view (to turn excess into 
‘incess’). Through its creative synthesis of form and content, the film attempts 
to force viewers to think or conceptualise the notoriously complex notion of 
void. 
Looking first at how film theory can help us to understand the film, 
we then investigate ways in which Enter the Void can enrich film theory and 
our understanding of cinema more generally, in particular our understanding 
of what film can do in the digital era. Incorporating ideas from neuroscience, 
from physics, and from somewhat esoteric research into hallucinogens, we 
propose that Enter the Void suggests a cinema that emphasises the related 
nature of all things, a related nature that we can see by being ‘beside oneself’, 
a process that cinema itself helps us to achieve. That is, cinema allows to 
become ‘spaced out’ and to ‘unbecome’ (to challenge our fixity of being) 
such that we can see our interconnected nature with all other things. 
Thanks to the challenging and graphic nature of films like I Stand 
Alone/Seul contre tous (France, 1998) and Irreversible/Irréversible (France, 
2002), Noé’s work has up until now been considered as part of the ‘New 
Extreme’ (Beugnet, 2007; Horeck and Kendall, 2012), the ‘post-modern 
pornography’ (Downing, 2004), and the ‘brutal intimacy’ (Palmer, 2011) that 
are thought characteristic of contemporary French art house cinema. 
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Alongside directors such as Catherine Breillat, Claire Denis and Bruno 
Dumont, Noé is famous, or infamous, for his violent and deeply affective 
films, as well as for his innovative and baroque use of the camera, which 
typically is wielded by cinematographer Benoît Debie. While these terms are 
all useful in contextualising Noé’s work within a specific moment in French 
cinema history, and while all would be applicable lenses through which to 
consider Enter the Void, we would prefer to offer a more film-philosophical 
approach to his work. 
Nonetheless, before we offer our interpretation of Enter the Void, and 
before we demonstrate how Enter the Void can help us better to understand 
what cinema itself can do, let us provide an overview of this extraordinary 
film. 
 
Enter 
Enter the Void stands out as one of the most aesthetically daring and 
philosophically stimulating films of recent times. The story opens by focusing 
on a young drug dealer, Oscar (Nathaniel Brown), smoking hallucinogenic 
Dimethyltryptamine (DMT) in his apartment before being shot dead in a 
police sting in The Void, a Tokyo bar. Thereafter, the film passes non-
chronologically through moments of Oscar’s life, folding together events 
from childhood and adulthood, showing the arrival of his sister Linda (Paz de 
la Huerta) in Tokyo, and her journey to becoming a stripper. In the post-death 
sequences, Oscar observes how he had been set up by his friend Victor (Olly 
Alexander) as revenge for having slept with his mother (Suzy Stockbridge). 
After his life flashes before his eyes and consciousness and he ‘re-lives’ his 
death, Oscar witnesses the aftermath of his life, including scenes of his body 
in the morgue, his sister aborting her child, seeing Victor slung out of his 
parents’ home, a confrontation between Linda and Victor, and, finally, Linda 
having sex with his friend Alex (Cyril Roy). The film ends with Oscar’s 
rebirth – to his own mother (Janice Sicotte-Béliveau) – suggesting his life is 
about to begin again. 
While Enter the Void involves a relatively unconventional storyline 
that jumps about within the fabula of Oscar’s lifetime, it is the style in which 
the film is shot and composited that marks it out as aesthetically experimental 
and deeply philosophical. For, after a breakneck stroboscopic opening 
sequence – affectively scored with thumping techno music – that flashes the 
names of creative personnel against solid colour backgrounds in a Tony 
Conrad-esque flicker-film fashion, Enter the Void gives the impression of 
being a single unbroken shot lasting over two hours and twenty minutes. Of 
course, this is not really the case, in that the narrative combines numerous 
shots captured in a number of places, including various Tokyo locations, 
which are digitally composited (by French special effects company BUF) in 
such a way that they appear seamlessly blended into a continuous whole. 
However, to say that the film gives the impression of being a single, unbroken 
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subjective shot is barely half the story. For, the ‘camera’ (if we can call it that) 
not only drifts through psyche and physics, passing seamlessly through solid 
architecture into interior locations, and over urban rooftops – at one point 
ascending so high that it enters a passing aeroplane within which viewers see 
Oscar’s mother breast-feeding a child she refers to by his name – but it also 
begins aesthetically to actualise the void from which all matter and memory 
are woven. 
Indeed, the narrative is marked by an unusual progression that passes 
from the human and subjective view of Oscar towards a ghostly or absent 
perspective associated with the lingering trace of his being. In this manner, 
the film invites viewers to connect with the philosophical concept of the void, 
which, as we shall see below, is shown to underlie the ground of all Being 
and appearance. 
If this description does not do justice to the extreme nature of the 
film’s aesthetics, then we should like further to describe the film as a marriage 
between the following: the seeming single-take films of Alfred Hitchcock’s 
Rope (USA, 1948) and Brian De Palma’s Snake Eyes (USA, 1998), with the 
latter being cited as a direct influence (see Sterritt, 2007, p. 307); the point of 
view experiments that are Lady in the Lake (Robert Montgomery, USA, 1947) 
and Dossier 51/Le dossier 51 (Michel Deville, France/West Germany, 1978), 
with Noé confessing to having seen the former on mushrooms, which in turn 
led him to want to make a POV film of someone on drugs (see Erickson, 
2010); the existential questioning of Being John Malkovich (Spike Jonze, 
USA, 1999); the freely moving camera-consciousness that passes through 
bodies and walls within David Fincher’s Fight Club (USA, 1999); the 
unbroken meandering through time that is Russian Ark/Russkiy kovcheg 
(Aleksandr Sokurov, Russia/Germany, 2002); and the psychedelic Star Gate 
sequences for which 2001: A Space Odyssey (Stanley Kubrick, USA/UK, 
1968) is best remembered, and which Noé also mentions as a formative 
experience that he felt was akin to an ‘ecstasy trip’ (see Sterritt, 2007, p. 314). 
The philosophical credentials of the narrative are also forged by lengthy 
descriptions of the Tibetan Book of the Dead, which are playfully inserted as 
a diegetic template for the film’s overarching journey. 
The film is theoretically composed from a single and literal 
perspective, namely Oscar’s, although this does not prevent the ‘camera,’ nor 
in this way Oscar’s POV, from freely drifting around the diegetic space once 
he is dead. Furthermore, the film incorporates scenes wherein narration 
passes beyond Oscar’s exclusive (subjective) vantage point, to enter the heads 
of other characters and objects within the immanent ‘void’ that embeds all 
Being and appearance. A particularly memorable example of this trope 
witnesses the subjective perspective ‘pass into’ Alex’s head as he has 
intercourse with Linda, thereby rendering (the voided) Oscar’s point-of-view 
of Alex’s point-of-view of his sister’s mid-coital face. More outrageous still, 
the camera thereafter passes into Linda’s uterus, observing the tip of Alex’s 
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penis ejaculating sperm into her body, before following microscopic 
spermatozoa up the fallopian tubes to be accepted by the ovum and catalyse 
a human conception. Thereafter the ‘camera’ passes from the gestating foetus 
within her womb into the rebirth sequence outlined above. 
Beyond any consideration of the film’s affective soundscape, Enter 
the Void incorporates an affective hallucinogenic mise-en-scène, wherein 
viewers are subjected to psychedelic arborescent growths appearing in front 
of (or behind) Oscar’s eyes as he trips on DMT, together with startling images 
depicting glowing streams of cosmic energy emanating from the genitals of 
copulating couples. Reading such sequences through Anna Powell’s Deleuze-
inflected lens of ‘altered states cinema’ illuminates how the film aims directly 
to affect the viewer’s brain and perceptive mechanisms during screening 
(Powell, 2007, p. 71). Here, drug-affected images and effects offer a ‘purely 
technological hallucinatory display disrupting norms of perspective by 
affective bombardment’ (Powell, 2007, p. 73). In these sequences the 
aesthetics are understood to possess narcotic properties to help invoke altered 
states of human perception. As viewer and film become conscious together in 
an embodied machinic-assemblage, the film functions as a consciousness-
altering ‘drug’ in and of itself, stimulating a form of ‘contact high’ (Powell, 
2007, p. 67). Such models grant credence to Noé’s reifying claims that the 
goal of his movie ‘was to induce an altered state of consciousness as much as 
possible inside the viewer’s brain’ and that his film should make (himself 
and) viewers feel ‘stoned’ (see Adams, 2010). 
Beyond drug-affected aesthetics, the film also encroaches upon 
‘spiritually’ affected planes, offering viewers the opportunity to ‘think’ the 
nature of being-qua-being and being-nothing (void). In order to explore how 
this is achieved, we would first like to turn our attention to the fluctuating 
modalities of narrative address, and engage with how they ‘think’ subjectivity 
and the void. 
 
From Subjective to Voided Narration 
Stylistically, Enter the Void does more than cycle around Oscar’s life and 
death, and is found mounting a complex spiritual and philosophical 
consideration of life as an event that is woven from the void. What is it that 
we mean by ‘the void’ and how is it that all objects and matter are woven 
therefrom? We shall work towards answering this question by first addressing 
the way in which Enter the Void segues together in its unbroken continuity 
three distinct and fluctuating modalities of cinematic narration, which we 
shall respectively describe as first person, second person and ‘absent.’ 
The film begins by employing a first person mode of narration, 
mediating the spectator’s view into the diegesis through a subjective POV 
trope reminiscent of Lady in the Lake. This POV, associated with Oscar, is 
initially ‘humanised’ by the inclusion of sporadic black frame flashes that 
suggest embodied blinking. The audio track further relates Oscar’s subjective 
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thoughts in a monotonous stream of consciousness that interlaces his 
utterances with Alex and Linda (the sound of his voice being slightly muffled 
to suggest we hear it from the inside of the body). Thus, the initial alignment 
takes up an embodied position synonymous with Oscar’s eyes and brain, 
positioning the viewer behind his eyelids and within his subjective 
consciousness. This stylistic folding of camera- and character-consciousness, 
which we will term a first person or subjective mode of address, gradually 
becomes eroded or transcended as the narrative progresses. During these 
subjective sequences, Oscar constitutes the ‘out-of-field,’ but it is worth 
stressing that he is not absent from the frame. Indeed, we witness Oscar 
interact with Linda and Alex, and see his hands enter the shot to load his drug 
pipe. Thus, although objective views of Oscar’s face are initially absent, his 
body is very much present within the scene. 
After his death, viewers are presented with a series of ‘disembodied’ 
perception-images as the camera rises out of Oscar’s body (an ‘out-of-body’ 
experience), before collapsing into a series of sequences from his memory of 
the past. Here, images from Oscar’s infanthood, childhood, adolescence and 
adulthood are folded together and stylistically linked by a framing trope 
wherein the camera is strategically positioned behind Oscar’s body, holding 
the back of his head and shoulders in medium close-up. The camera 
relentlessly frames the back of Oscar’s head in the foreground, utilising his 
body to block and mediate the/his view into the diegesis. We shall call this 
mode of address, whereby we see behind Oscar’s head and body rather than 
his direct point of view, a second person perspective. In these scenes the 
images are defined by a form of self-perception – in that we are possibly 
seeing Oscar’s memory of himself rather than truly objective, or third person, 
images. Since they are not necessarily objective, the term ‘second person’ 
serves at the very least to introduce a gap or fissure between Oscar as the 
subject and object of the gaze, between Oscar as subject and object. 
Let us linger a short while on this term in order to make it clear that 
in calling such shots ‘second person’ we are not attempting to propose an 
abstract or grand theory regarding this particular framing trope. It is not that 
every shot in every film that features the back of a character’s head in medium 
close up constitutes a second person shot; and it is not that these shots are told 
in the cinematic equivalent of the ‘second person’ – using the pronoun you. 
Rather, we argue that the term can be fruitfully applied here since it helps us 
(and the film) to ‘think’ the incrementally growing movement from subject 
to void. Here, then, viewers see a ‘first remove’ from Oscar, or Oscar seeing 
himself as a ‘second person’ – a concept that we shall relate later on to the 
notion of being ‘beside oneself.’ 
However, Enter the Void does not stop there. Instead, the film 
progresses further, marking a trajectory from showing us Oscar’s POV, to 
Oscar seeing himself as a second person, and finally to Oscar being absent, 
or voided, from the film – even though the film has given us the impression 
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that there has not been a cut. That is, Oscar’s ‘disappearance’ from the film 
is not marked by a formal stylistic device like the cut, which usually separates 
different POV shots from objective shots and so on. Instead, without a cut, 
Oscar has drifted into ‘the void.’ For, in the narrative’s post-death or post-
human sequences, the film introduces a third mode of address that does not 
correlate with Oscar as an embodied character within the diegesis: we do not 
see directly from his physical perspective (replete with blinks, hands coming 
into frame, and muffled sound), nor do we see the back of his head in frame 
as per the ‘second person’ mode outlined above. Instead, the image is less 
obviously associated with any person at all, and yet, because of the absence 
of cuts, it retains a trace of Oscar’s (voided) subjectivity. 
Having explained the progression within the film from first person to 
second person to void, it is now time for us to explain what it is that we mean 
by the term ‘void.’ In order to do so, we shall turn to the work of Gilles 
Deleuze. 
 
Thinking The Void 
In Cinema 1, Deleuze aligns ‘the void’ with the ‘out-of-field,’ or what is 
understood to exceed the frame. In movement-image cinema, that which 
escapes the camera’s framing ‘testifies to a more disturbing presence, one 
which cannot be said even to exist, but rather to “insist” or “subsist”’ 
(Deleuze, 2005a, p. 18). As all framing necessarily determines an out-of-field, 
the void of Cinema 1 is external to the film itself. Since Deleuze aligns the 
movement-image with the body’s sensory-motor-schema, however, Enter the 
Void does not really realise a movement-image form of void, because even in 
the film’s opening moments, when subjectivity is clearly aligned with Oscar’s 
bodily experiences, the inclusion of altered states drug images suggests that 
the actual and the virtual have already moved into expressive relation. In other 
words, a ‘normal’ sensory-motor-schema is already compromised. The film 
then stages an ‘internal’ transformation as after Oscar’s death its narration 
shifts from the subjective/first person, via the ‘second person’ mode outlined 
above, and towards the ‘absent’/voided perspective. This progression would 
suggest that the connoted ‘out-of-field’ that is the void of Cinema 1 
transmutes to become Oscar’s voided subjectivity. 
In Cinema 2, the concept of the out-of-field transforms for Deleuze, 
and is marked by the introduction of another, more immediate, conception of 
the void. In the time-image, the void becomes synonymous with the cut 
‘internal’ to the film, with Deleuze suggesting that the edit or interstice 
between frames signals another form of voiding that ostensibly becomes 
invisible. In this way, the void external to the movement-image film 
transforms to become an internal void, shifting from the out-of-field towards 
the cut. Alex Ling argues that the jump from the movement-image to the time-
image void therefore ‘denotes a shift from the “inside outside” of the film (the 
whole being the very idea of inside, of the absolute – and fundamentally 
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paradoxical – containment of the One-All) to the “outside inside” of the film 
(qua cut)’ (Ling, 2010, p. 122). As Enter the Void shifts to the ‘absent’ mode 
of cinematic address, the film’s perception becomes increasingly aligned and 
folded into the void itself (the outside-within). 
Enter the Void’s free-form movement through digitally composited 
cinematic time and space is marked by a conspicuous lack of cuts, with a 
continuous flowing mode of spatial and temporal perception taking the place 
of editing. Indeed, the ‘camera’ increasingly becomes free to pass through 
memory and matter, time and space without recourse to any apparent cutting 
whatsoever (the black interstices that are Oscar’s blinks aside). In Cinema 2, 
Deleuze, after Robert Lapoujade, articulates a shift from montage to 
montrage, which recalls Bazin’s predilection for Welles and Renoir over 
Eisenstein (Deleuze, 2005b, p. 40). That is, in the post-war context, cinema 
no longer cuts, but is instead defined by continuity, by showing (‘montrer’ in 
French). William Brown has argued, along with David Bordwell, that digital 
technology plays a key role in ‘intensifying’ the 
continuity/‘montrage’/‘monstrous’ nature of contemporary cinema (Brown, 
2009a; Brown, 2012; Bordwell, 2006, p. 117-189). Beyond Deleuze’s 
broadly antihumanist stance, then, a digital cinema that can pass through 
space and all that fills it, be that empty air, a wall, or even the uterus of a 
human, without seeming to cut, as per Enter the Void, would seem to suggest 
a new conception of the void. Rather than simply being the out-of-field, as in 
Cinema 1, or the cut, as in Cinema 2, Enter the Void demonstrates the void 
itself. What previously Deleuze defined as ‘insisting’ or ‘subsisting’ the 
image may now be understood differently; in Enter the Void, that which 
previously exceeded the image (because it lay beyond the spatial or temporal 
bounds of the frame) is now incessantly within the image. Cinema in the 
digital age may, in most instances, be a cinema that retains cutting as a 
skeuomorphic convention, but as in Enter the Void, digitally composited 
filmic space and flowing narration offer multiple other possible and 
impossible perspectives, movements, and objects, along with an ability to 
zigzag across different temporal planes without ever resorting to a cut. In this 
sense Enter the Void’s soluble cinematic perception seemingly fills out 
(actualises) and replaces (becomes) the void (previously aligned with the cut), 
and a flowing continuous perception passing seamlessly through psyche and 
matter replaces the edit. Thus, the film’s digitalised perception opens up the 
entire finitude of the time-space continuum so that excess becomes ‘incess.’ 
To clarify what we mean it becomes important to investigate how the 
three interrelated modes of cinematic narration (first person, second person, 
absent/void) and the camera presence employed within the film ‘think’ the 
nature of being and non-being from the perspective of the void. 
 
The Void’s Entrance 
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The film begins by utilising a first person modality. Murray Smith argues that, 
from a cognitive perspective, POV functions to help viewers imagine 
characters from ‘the inside,’ and the technique appears as part of a larger 
strategy to ‘promote central imagining as a part of a larger structure of 
multifaceted alignment’ (Smith, 1997, p. 417). Narrative films typically 
incorporate POV shots within a web of other shot types, then, and it is this 
web that offers to viewers multiple forms of access to a character – by 
showing not only what they see, but also ‘objective’ images depicting their 
reactions to, and experiences of narrative events. It is these other forms of 
shot that are conspicuously absent from Enter the Void’s opening sequences, 
where we have only one or two moments that feature Oscar’s face (in a 
mirror). If, for Deleuze, a close-up of a character’s face (what he terms an 
‘affection-image’) serves directly to communicate how they feel or think 
about a situation, Enter the Void on the whole prohibits viewers from seeing 
what Oscar feels or thinks about events, and instead demands that viewers 
‘read’ the image(s) in order to build up a picture of who and what Oscar is. 
By denying a reverse-shot to reveal the gaze’s owner, the reverse-shot (or 
sutured image) is what is voided, or absent, in the film’s opening. Thus we 
begin from the limited perspective of the one minus the multiple 
(‘alignment’). 
During Oscar’s early onscreen drug revelries, the subjective camera 
does offer another alignment. Here, the camera follows his ascending 
‘consciousness,’ elevating above and beyond his purely embodied position to 
offer a drug-induced ‘out-of-body’ experience. Hovering above Oscar’s 
prostrate form, the camera looks down at the body that previously constituted 
the out-of-field. Although this shot offers a delayed reverse-shot (or 
opportunity to perceive the owner of the gaze), it either remains out of focus 
or vertiginously spins around his face so that centrifugal forces make the 
camera movement a more prominent subject of the shot than Oscar. At these 
moments Oscar’s subjectivity and the camera become loosened from a purely 
embodied mode, with Oscar understood to be perceiving himself (as an 
object) whilst never fully relinquishing his position as subject of the gaze.  
As per Ling’s philosophical reading of Samuel Beckett’s Film (Alan 
Schneider, USA, 1965), we can recognize how this mode of self perception 
or aperception is also ‘strictly speaking void’ (Ling, 2010, p. 77). In line with 
Film, we can understand Noé’s film mounting an investigation into the nature 
of ‘film qua film’ through a story (‘both’ and ‘neither’) of tragedy and 
transcendence. In both we also find a ‘single, albeit sundered’ subject who is 
at once the object and subject of the camera’s gaze (Ling, 2010, p. 72-73). 
These self-perceiving subjects either experience or enter into a world beyond 
speech, and by subtracting this realm (or being subtracted from it) both 
Beckett and Noé force viewers to confront and think the image – which in 
both films displays a primary concern with the (impossible) ‘invisible being 
of all appearance’ (Ling, 2010, p. 76). In this manner we can recognise how 
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Film and Enter the Void explore the essence of cinema, or what cinema is 
becoming, and by so doing, set out a notion of appearance for itself, or 
appearance in-itself, which works to overcome the self-perception of being 
by moving thought or thinking towards unbecoming, qua an escape from a 
fixity of being. 
In this manner, the concept of void enters into the filmic assemblage 
for the first time via a fissure opened up by Oscar’s drug-induced self-
perception. Moments later, the camera/perception returns to a POV modality, 
showing Oscar framed in a mirror attempting to sober himself up by splashing 
water on his face. It is here that viewers are first treated to the only well-lit 
shot of Oscar as an objective character in the film. Interestingly, this first clear 
view of his face captures an image of him ‘off his face’ on drugs, trying to 
perceive objectively the affects of a chemical substance upon his face, but 
from a subjective position. 
After the ‘first’ death scene, filmed entirely from Oscar’s POV, the 
camera-perspective begins to disengage itself from the dying body, initially 
hovering over and looking down upon him in another out-of-body experience. 
During these moments of self-perception, we find the first significant shift 
from Oscar’s subjectivity to the voided view. Because the sequence initially 
reflects the earlier scene of Oscar’s drug high, the out-of-body trope hints that 
the rest of the narrative may be read as a subjective journey of brain-death 
through a crystal of memory and fantasy (partially guided by Oscar’s earlier 
reading and discussions of the Tibetan Book of the Dead, about which more 
below). That is, after this ‘subjective,’ or literal, death, the film begins to 
move backwards and forwards through Oscar’s past, seamlessly zigzagging 
through disparate sheets of memory and time. Noé’s distinctive framing of 
these sequences from behind Oscar’s head (the second person) continues to 
deny viewers any image of Oscar’s face (qua affection-images), and thus 
continues to erect a distance between the viewer’s knowledge of his feelings 
and experiences. By becoming ‘once removed’ the film also renders Oscar 
more of an object than subject of the gaze, particularly as the audio stream of 
consciousness, prevalent in the first person sequences, has also been voided; 
we are no longer in Oscar’s brain. In the sequences depicting his parents’ 
horrific death in a violent car crash we do not necessarily need facial shots to 
understand his emotional response, but at other moments the conspicuous 
lack of a facial shot or affection-image draws attention to this stylistic framing 
choice. 
A notable example frames Victor facing Oscar (and the camera). 
Here, Victor accusingly asks Oscar if he is sleeping with his mother. Victor’s 
question elicits no immediate verbal response, and an uncomfortable silence 
ensues. This immediately draws attention to Oscar’s ‘loss of face.’ It thus 
becomes Victor’s reaction to Oscar’s absent face that signals to the viewer 
that Oscar’s guilty face has given him away. In this manner there is a form of 
feedback loop, in that Victor’s reaction serves as the affection-image which 
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viewers read, but which is itself triggered by his perception of Oscar’s 
absent/voided face. Thus, throughout his past memory it is often the reactions 
of others that grant viewers access to Oscar’s voided-image, and Oscar’s face 
only becomes accessible via its trace. 
Thereafter, the film’s perceptions introduce an intensified temporal 
and spatial ‘montrage’ through various sequences, wherein the ‘absent’ 
(voided-Oscar) drifts freely around Tokyo observing the effect of his death 
upon other characters. As time’s passage continues, the absent perspective 
continues to view the trace of Oscar’s life on those he left behind. He enters 
his sister’s brain to share in a virtual dream in which she imagines Oscar 
returning from the dead as a zombie, as well as actual images where she 
washes his ashes down the drain. Here, the overarching aesthetic shift 
completes the movement from human subjectivity towards a post-human 
perception of/from the void. Thematically, this achieves a switch in cinematic 
thought or thinking from the position of ‘subject’ to that of ‘void,’ wherein 
hard-edged divisions familiar to our usual embodied experience of 
movement, time and objects dissolve. As consciousness and matter no longer 
formulate wholly separate categories, they begin to blend into a seamless 
continuity through cinematic perception that takes up the non-human 
perspective of the void itself. This gradual dissolving of Oscar into other 
people and pure matter traces out his becoming-imperceptible, or becoming-
voided, and witnesses him merging with the plane of immanence – in such a 
way that being, matter and life are understood as being woven from the void. 
For, in his journey from self to immanence/void, Oscar becomes one with 
being (the totality of all that exists as opposed to his subjective being), and he 
attains what Deleuze might call ‘a cosmic and spiritual lapping’ (Deleuze, 
1997, p. 26), in the sense that the personal and the whole form a single 
continuum, rather than existing entirely separately. 
Consideration of the film’s spiritual elements allows us to illuminate 
how the film’s form and content, or philosophy and aesthetics, are 
expressively intertwined. Indeed, the passage from physical human to 
metaphysical post-human, from subject to void, is mirrored by the film’s 
formal expression, which can be read as both an elegy for ‘humanist’ modes 
of cinematic expression and an enthusiastic embrace of ‘post-humanist,’ 
particularly digital, forms. That is, the film’s single take form, together with 
its ability to pass through solid objects and humans as if they were thin air, 
suggests the decentralisation of the human in Noé’s film, and a more ‘post-
human’ aesthetic, as also suggested in other films that feature such digitally 
enabled shots, such as Fight Club (see Brown, 2009b; Brown and Fleming, 
2011). Through its remarkable combination of the long take, psychedelic 
visuals, the mixture of POV, second person and voided shots, and its 
impossible camera movements, not only is Enter the Void an aesthetic 
landmark, then, but it also offers new ways for us to conceptualise cinema in 
the digital era. To this end, while the film embraces new post-human forms 
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(passing from POV to the voided shots and through walls and people without 
a cut – movements enabled by digital technology), we wish to explore the 
ramifications of this for how we conceptualise the cinematic experience, or 
what cinema can do. With this latter point in mind, the essay will now move 
to synthesise various strands of contemporary film theory at the intersection 
of which Enter the Void seems to situate itself. 
 
Monstrous Epiphany 
It is well known that André Bazin rejected montage in favour of films that 
employed depth, continuity, and, after Cesare Zavattini, neorealist tales in 
which ‘nothing happens’ (Bazin, 1967). While Enter the Void is clearly not a 
film in which ‘nothing’ happens (nor indeed are many neorealist films), it is 
a film where nothing is actualised, and a film that seems to take spatial 
continuity to the extreme, as we drift, for what certain viewers may feel is a 
frustratingly long period, across the whole of Tokyo in seemingly unbroken 
shots. While Bazin’s myth of total cinema is no doubt a guiding text that helps 
us think about Enter the Void, it is Deleuze who helps us go beyond Bazin 
and humanism towards a posthumanist cinema. 
Deleuze traces a shift away from a cinema dominated by 
anthropocentric movement towards films where human characters are 
overwhelmed by their surroundings and become insignificant. The relative 
slowness of travel across Tokyo spaces, neither broken into noticeably 
different or fragmented shots, means Enter the Void offers a conception of 
cinema wherein experiences of space involve duration, bringing this thematic 
to the fore in a more overt manner than neorealist cinema. Furthermore, as 
narration slides back and forth through time without cuts or dissolves, the film 
thinks the interaction of different time planes in a manner akin to Deleuze’s 
time-image models. These are actualised by sequences incorporating scenes 
of Oscar’s past life, which invoke Deleuze’s desire for cinema to become like 
memory or thought, where past-images invade the present of the screen. As 
discussed, the film also incorporates vivid hallucinations, invoking a blurring 
between fantasy and reality that Deleuze praised in films like Last Year at 
Marienbad/L’année dernière à Marienbad (Alain Resnais, France/Italy, 
1961). Before dying, Oscar endures a ‘weakened’ motor control through 
taking drugs, experiencing pure optic and sonic situations/signs, and so 
surfaces as a cinematic ‘seer’ (Deleuze, 2005b, p. 39). 
As discussed, the collapsing of subjective and objective perspectives, 
and the folding of reality and imagination or hallucination, matter and 
memory, empty space with all that fills it, demonstrates how Enter the Void 
erects a challenging philosophical and aesthetic realisation of the void. We 
would argue that a narrative where the camera can pass through solid objects 
as easily as it does empty air conforms to what Deleuze would call a ‘gaseous’ 
cinema, which he originally relates through the ‘molecular perception’ of 
1960s American expanded cinema and Dziga Vertov’s Man with a Movie 
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Camera (USSR, 1929) (Deleuze, 2005a, pp. 81-85). Significantly, John 
Johnston argues that Vertov’s molecular perception thinks the (be)coming 
community of the Soviet state, which summons the dissolution of boundaries 
between subject and object – wherein humans achieve an equality and 
collective identity that overrides individual identity (Johnston, 1999, pp. 37-
38). Furthermore, in the expanded cinema evoked within Enter the Void via 
the flicker film-like opening and the psychedelic sequences, we move from a 
world of doing to a world of pure seeing, which Deleuze expresses through 
references to Carlos Castaneda, the author and shaman, or nagual, who 
experimented with psychedelic drugs, especially peyote, and whose role in 
Deleuze’s thought we shall discuss below. 
Powell explains that Castaneda’s work is not taken literally by 
Deleuze (and Guattari), but is emblematic of another way of life that is most 
clearly summarised by the term ‘becoming’ (Powell, 2007, pp. 56-61). 
Castaneda’s experiences engage with conditions whereby perception is 
rethought from the bottom up, not understanding himself as detached from 
the world, even though he observes it, nor without agency, but in such a way 
that the world also acts on him; that is, the world sees him as much as he sees 
it. In this sense, the boundary between Castaneda and the world disappears as 
he becomes all that surrounds him (both subject and object) in a manner akin 
to Enter the Void. 
Given that Castaneda’s work incorporates the use of psychotropic 
drugs, it shares common ground with Noé’s film that is worth exploring in 
greater detail. Enter the Void’s narrative is purportedly inspired by the 
Tibetan Book of the Dead, but the resemblance between the two is minimal 
enough that we shall forsake a detailed and direct comparison here. However, 
the Tibetan Book of the Dead does serve to bridge the gap between Enter the 
Void and drug culture. For instance, Noé discusses how DMT is believed to 
be a naturally occurring chemical that the human brain emits when it is 
dreaming or dying (Adams 2010), whilst similar chemical experiences 
inspired Timothy Leary and colleagues to compose in 1964 The Psychedelic 
Experience: A Manual Based on the Tibetan Book of the Dead as a guide to 
drug taking (Leary et al., 2008). The primary reason for this is that both texts, 
The Book of the Dead and The Psychedelic Experience, seek to promote the 
loss of ego. That is, both attempt to prepare readers for the moment when the 
boundary between subject and object disappears (and when the void appears). 
While Enter the Void is not a particularly close adaptation of the Tibetan Book 
of the Dead, the fact that it features both hallucinations provoked by 
psychotropic drugs and a ‘camera’ that passes from one point of view to the 
next without so much as a cut to signal the transition, means that it, too, tries 
to think a similar experience, wherein subjects and objects merge via a 
‘gaseous’ mode of perception. 
This weave of psychedelic and Buddhist literature can be taken a step 
further by evoking Alexander and Ann Shulgin’s classic guides to drug 
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consumption, PiHKAL: A Love Story, wherein PiHKAL formulates an 
acronym for ‘Phenethylamines i [sic.] Have Known And Loved’ (Shulgin and 
Shulgin 1995), and TiHKAL: The Continuation, which offers the same 
acronym regarding tryptamines (Shulgin and Shulgin 1997). Regardless of 
the legitimacy or otherwise of such writings, Shulgin offers an account of his 
experiences with various phenethylamines and tryptamines – psychotropic 
drugs akin to the ones Oscar takes in Enter the Void. For example, Shulgin 
describes smoking 100g of DMT as follows: 
 
As I exhaled I became terribly afraid, my heart very rapid and strong, 
palms sweating. A terrible sense of dread and doom filled me – I knew 
what was happening, I knew I couldn't stop it, but it was so 
devastating; I was being destroyed – all that was familiar, all reference 
points, all identity – all viciously shattered in a few seconds. I couldn't 
even mourn the loss – there was no one left to do the mourning. Up, 
up, out, out, eyes closed, I am at the speed of light, expanding, 
expanding, expanding, faster and faster until I have become so large 
that I no longer exist – my speed is so great that everything has come 
to a stop – here I gaze upon the entire universe. (Shulgin and Shulgin, 
1997) 
 
Similar visions and experiences of ‘losing human form’ and leaving the planet 
are echoed by Noé in his descriptions of imbibing Ayahuasca, a drink heavily 
laced with DMT, as part of his ‘professional research’ for making the film 
(see Lambie, 2010). Hopefully those who have seen or read our descriptions 
of Enter the Void, then, will sense immediately the resonances between Noé 
and Shulgin’s experiences and those of Oscar within the film: his early drug 
experience involves and is defined by both an upwards and an outwards 
movement as we drift away from his body, an experience experienced more 
intensely after his death, with all identity ultimately shattered, or what we 
have termed voided. 
We will return to consider how Enter the Void may function as a 
hallucinogenic drug for the viewer, but presently we wish briefly to explore 
psychedelic drugs, especially phenethylamines (which occur naturally in 
humans – as well as in foodstuffs like chocolate – and with high 
concentrations being linked to schizophrenia; see Himwich, Kety and 
Smythies 1967). Playfully, we should like to point out that the etymology of 
phenethylamine comes in part from the Greek phanein, which means to show, 
and is linked to the illuminating gas used by oracles (or so says Shulgin; 
tryptamine meanwhile is derived from the verb tryein, meaning to rub or wear 
down). To push this further, it seems appropriate that a digitally ‘monstrous’ 
cinema that ‘gaseously’ demonstrates could also be linked to substances that 
are similarly thought to show (making what is not normally visible 
perceptible), or to inspire, moments of epiphany through gases, and to wear 
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down solid boundaries between self and world and to have subjects and 
objects rub together in such a way that they become indistinguishable. 
 
Spaced Out 
Beyond these etymological links between the showing/phanein and the 
wearing down/tryein of drugs and the showing/demonstrating of cinema and 
the wearing down and rubbing of subjectivity and objectivity in Enter the 
Void, we should establish what it is that Enter the Void shows us. We have 
already listed some phenomena above, including cosmic flows of erotic 
energy and the inside of a vagina. But unusual objects are not quite what we 
wish to discuss here. Rather, because all these are shown in one continuous 
and seemingly unbroken shot, Enter the Void does not show us objects, but 
more pointedly that which exists between these objects, that from which all 
objects and matter are woven – namely the void itself. 
Thematically, this is fitting, as the film, like the Tibetan Book of the 
Dead, thinks the stage between life and death. But more than this, it shows 
what is between objects, namely empty space itself, or the void. In an essay 
that connects the Tibetan Book of the Dead to Deleuze, N. Robert Glass 
discusses notions of the between and two concepts of the other (Glass, 2001). 
For Deleuze, there are two types of otherness, which he discusses in relation 
to Michel Tournier’s 1967 novel Friday. Firstly, there are the actual others 
we see, but then there is also a second level of otherness, which is understood 
as the way in which the fact of others moulds our perceptions. That is, if we 
lived for long enough without other human beings (as might happen to 
someone stranded on a desert island), would we ‘enter into an alternate 
perceptual and affective world’ (Glass, 2001, p. 67; see also Deleuze 1984)? 
While it is hard for us to prove this (since to measure it, we would have to be 
present with the supposedly isolated person), what the question illuminates is 
the way in which perceptions and desires are shaped by the fact of others, 
whether we can literally see actual other people or not. In effect, and in a 
manner similar to Jean-Luc Nancy’s conception of ‘being singular plural,’ we 
are always with others; we are fundamentally social, and while we think of 
others as separate (because they appear within our field of vision), it is the 
very fact of with-ness that offers the precondition for our ability to perceive 
them at all (Nancy, 2000; for more on ‘withness’ and cinema, see Brown, 
2013). Thus, the Tibetan Book of the Dead is a guide that, after Glass, 
supposedly helps us to see not only actual others, but also that which is 
between us (space itself) as the founding condition of our with-ness (that 
which connects us). So, too, Enter the Void, via its (digitally-enabled) gaseous 
continuity does not think space as fragmented into objects and that which 
divides them, but rather shows space and matter as a single continuum 
(connected). Purloining a Deleuze/Glass example, we see a table and a chair 
as separate objects but ice and water as different modes of the same thing 
(H2O). When we see ‘between,’ when we see space itself and that we are 
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fundamentally ‘with’ others, objects and people become less like the table 
and chair, and more like continuous ice and water. Space does not separate 
us, then, it connects us; and the ‘between’ that Enter the Void thinks is 
fundamentally rendered temporal (as spaced-time). 
As a consequence, Oscar’s ‘ego’ is transcended and the dichotomy 
between subject and object becomes irrelevant. Tibetan Buddhists not only 
see this as a perspective to help prepare for death, but also as a mode of living. 
To connect this back to the drug culture that forms the core of Enter the Void, 
reaching this state of seeing ‘between,’ and recognising the foundation of our 
fundamentally social nature (‘with-ness’), we must literally ‘spatialise’ 
ourselves, or become ‘spaced out,’ so that – as per the film’s aesthetics – there 
is no gap between subject and object. Both are part of a single continuum, and 
both psychedelic drugs – and cinema – can help us to see/think this. 
 
Cognitivism and physics 
The argument has perhaps taken a rather esoteric turn at this point and some 
reasonable questions likely linger. In particular, a drug-induced hallucination 
will, for what we shall call ‘objectivists,’ simply not constitute the means of 
seeing something ‘real’; whatever is ‘seen’ in such conditions is patently not 
real, and just a figment of the imagination. However, we can draw upon both 
the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard’ sciences to counter this objection – if not here 
definitively to disprove it. Where Greg Hainge (2012) has considered Enter 
the Void from the concept of anatomy, then, we shall look at the film through 
the lens of cognitive psychnology and physics. 
In cognitive psychology, there have historically been two strands of 
thought pertaining to perception: those which favour direct perception (we 
perceive objects in the world as they are) and those which favour indirect 
perception (our perceptions are always mediated by our senses or our brain). 
To cite one of many sources that argue as much, Nobel prize winning 
neuroscientist Gerald M. Edelman points out that colour and other ‘qualia’ in 
our perceptual field are not properties of the object itself; that is, colour 
perception alone would seem to suggest that perception is indirect and 
mediated by the senses (Edelman and Tononi, 2001, p. 159ff). Influential 
cognitivist James J. Gibson (1986), meanwhile, whose work is often cited in 
relation to cognitive approaches to film, would argue that we can only 
perceive ‘ecologically’; that is to say, our perception is dependent upon input 
from the external world. In the case of a drug-induced hallucination, it would 
seem that qualia, or the intensity with which we see certain properties of the 
visual field, would be indirectly perceived – that is, in part if not wholly a 
product of the brain. If it is well known that some humans are blind to certain 
objects in their visual field, then we must similarly ask how perception can 
be direct; what is it if not the brain that blocks out information that stares 
other people, literally, in the face? And if direct perception becomes hard to 
sustain in the face of certain forms of blindness, then might we not also posit 
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that certain hallucinations can conversely be solely the product of the mind? 
In other words, to see ‘between’ as per Enter the Void is to see nothing ‘real’ 
at all. 
However, if we are always and inescapably in, or better with, the 
world, then there can be no hallucination that is purely the product of the 
brain. Cinema itself can function as a tool for thinking through this issue. 
Films show us that which does not exist, especially digital special effects 
films that have lost analogue cinema’s indexical link to reality, a loss that 
preoccupies many scholars of the digital (for one of the earlier explorations 
of this issue, see for example Mitchell, 1992). And yet, even if ‘false,’ films 
can and do have tangible effects on humans, from visceral to emotional to 
intellectual responses. Neurocinematics, that branch of neuroscience and film 
studies that analyses what happens in the human brain during film viewing, 
can function here to reaffirm that the borderline between ‘false’ and ‘real’ is 
an arbitrary one – and that the false and the real lie on a continuum that 
suggests not their separation but their connectedness. Neurocinematics would 
seem to affirm this because scholars studying what happens in the human 
brain during film viewing have seen that brains often respond in the same way 
to certain movies (see Hasson, et al., 2004; 2008a; 2008b; Kauppi, et al., 
2011). This suggests that we are conscious not of but with films – in that the 
virtual realities of cinema are real enough, otherwise they would not have any 
common effect on us. 
One might still contend that a film is ‘out there’ while a hallucination 
is only ever ‘in here.’ A weak defence, but one that we would like to make 
anyway, is that we are only sensitive to some five per cent of the light 
spectrum (Vogel, 2005, p. 16). That to which we are sensitive naturally 
depends upon the abilities of our senses to detect it, as well as on our brain, 
the chemical constitution of which also provides the means with which we 
can process raw information into perceptual data. Changing the chemical 
constitution of our brain is something that we do at all times, whether we 
ingest coffee, alcohol, vegetables, meat or hard drugs. Since inescapably we 
are in or with the world, changing our perceptual abilities through the use of 
drugs does not simply mean that we create ‘objects’ that are not there; instead 
it modifies the range of objects to which we are sensitive, such that what we 
hallucinate may not necessarily be an accurate representation of what is out 
there (it is mediated by the brain, after all), but it does respond to things out 
there, since there can be no isolation in the face of our absolute with-ness. In 
other words, between direct and indirect perception, hallucinations and the 
ability to see ‘between’ can be posited as true (which potentially makes sense 
of the ‘profundity’ that the DMT and/or the phenethylamine experience can 
offer: finally sensible form is given to things that we cannot directly perceive, 
but which we know to be there). 
The world of quantum physics can also step in here to help pursue this 
matter further. Realism has in physics been under attack since the discovery 
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of the quantum world. What this means is that physical properties are not 
necessarily ‘out there,’ but that they are dependent upon, or inextricably 
linked to, the way in which observers observe. Werner Heisenberg was the 
first to discover that one could not simultaneously measure the position and 
the momentum of a particle – and not because of flaws in the measuring 
system, but because the system could not have such a measurement 
(Heisenberg, 2000, pp. 3-26). An electron is, famously, both a wave and a 
particle (or, as physicists term it, it ‘decoheres’), and its ability to manifest 
itself in the world is always limited; the more it is visible as a particle (with a 
fixed location), the less it is visible as a wave. After Niels Bohr, these dual 
properties, wave/momentum and particle/position, are complementary; that 
is, the more the electron’s position is determined, the less its momentum is 
determined. One cannot fully measure the position of a particle, then, because 
its momentum would be fully unmeasured, which is a physical impossibility. 
In other words, electrons do not behave in a deterministic manner. 
Furthermore, since Einstein, it has been known that particles, such as 
photons and ions, are, or at the very least can be, ‘entangled’; that is, pairs of 
photons can behave in such a way that they are always in the same state (or 
polarised in the same fashion), regardless of the distance separating them. 
This befuddled Einstein such that he called this ‘spooky action at a distance,’ 
it being spooky because for photons to behave in this way would suggest that 
information travels faster than the speed of light, which for Einsteinian 
physics is an impossibility (see Zeilinger, 2003). Entanglement, however, is 
not information being passed from one photon to another over impossible 
distances; entanglement, rather, suggests their complementarity, or the 
(admittedly boggling) connection of particles. In the terms of this essay, it 
suggests the inherent ‘with-ness’ of particles. 
As Bohr wrote in 1937, complementarity can appear to ‘involve a 
mysticism incompatible with the true spirit of science’ (Bohr, 1937, p. 289). 
One could easily critique our use of physics here as an intellectual imposture 
(Sokal and Bricmont, 1998), and one could also tar us with the brush of 
choosing esoterica from the sciences that remains far from proven, even if 
friendly to readership-hungry magazines like Scientific American. What does 
such a view of physics have to do with Enter the Void? Well, if quantum 
mechanics suggest that particles decohere, or give the appearance of being 
either a particle or a wave to those that observe them – i.e. observation 
determines (at least the appearance) of behaviour, then this, together with the 
cognitive approach outlined above, hopefully serves as some evidence for the 
validity of the philosophical interpretation of Enter the Void offered here. 
That is to say, its mystical world that collapses the need for a subject-object 
binarism, finds some support in the ‘entangled’ and ‘complementary’ world 
of quantum physics, as well as in the ‘ecological’ and brain-mediated world 
of perception, in which, for Edelman and Tononi, all information undergoes 
‘re-entry,’ which can be described as a process whereby all sources of 
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information influence the perceived outcome of that information. We are in, 
or with, a world in (or with) which everything is connected – and Enter the 
Void tries to make us see the connecting space that is ‘between,’ or better 
with, all of us, namely the void itself. 
 
Beside oneself, or unbecoming cinema 
The Shulgins describes the hilarity of being on certain phenetheylamines, 
especially MDA, which is often referred to as the ‘love drug.’ In another 
context, William Brown, following Henri Bergson’s theory of laughter, 
argues for the inherently ‘comic’ nature of motion capture films, which 
involve the digital pasted onto the human in such a way that the distorted 
result is, or should be considered, humorous – even if a motion capture film 
like Beowulf (Robert Zemeckis, USA, 2007) is not particularly funny (see 
Brown 2009a). Not only does Enter the Void offer us a digital ‘reality’ that is 
similarly pasted on to the profilmic, but its ‘spaced out’ nature literally shows 
us Oscar ‘beside himself’ – a trope first signalled by the ‘second person’ shots 
that we have described and by the fuller, more elaborate out-of-body 
experiences signalled during Oscar’s DMT high and after his death. True 
enough, with its violence and anger, the film is not overtly comic – though 
Noé does consider both I Stand Alone and Irreversible to be at least partly 
funny, meaning that the same could apply in his mind to Enter the Void (see 
Sterritt, 2007, p. 314). Nonetheless, Enter the Void is what we shall term 
‘hilarious’ on another, formal, level. That is, as hilarity itself is 
etymologically linked to the Greek hilaos, or kindness, so, too, is the ‘with-
ness’ shown in Enter the Void an incitement to kindness. 
In a film that involves behaviour that is unbecoming for kind people, 
to stand beside oneself, to let go of one’s ego, is to recognise one’s shared 
placed in/with the world; it is to take a step towards forgiveness, towards 
kindness, towards love. In the confused, chaotic and hateful world of Enter 
the Void, the story also becomes a search for love in the void, as Alex and 
Linda’s union at the climax of the film testifies. What arguably becomes true 
for Oscar, that he literally stands beside himself, or becomes ‘spaced out’ in 
a manner that allows him to see the interlinked and communal nature of 
existence (both human-human and human-planetary-universal existence), is 
also possibly true for the viewer. If not plainly comic or funny, nor obviously 
scientific, the film seeks to show the familiar in an unfamiliar way. 
As befits a film by Gaspar Noé, Enter the Void is replete with graphic 
sex and violence. However, it is also a film that formally makes us rethink 
cinema. As much as it is a film about Oscar’s unbecoming, so, too, is the film 
(an) unbecoming of cinema. For, a cinema in which time and space and all 
that fills it are placed on a single, interconnected or entangled continuum, is 
necessarily a non-anthropocentric cinema quite unlike the individualistic and 
anthropocentric mainstream cinema. Even if/precisely because Enter the Void 
does have cinematic precursors – as the examples from Dossier 51 to 2001 
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made clear earlier – it is part of the cinematic continuum itself, and it 
crystallises qualities that existed as only potential within other films. After 
Dudley Andrew, then, cinema is a dynamic process that is constantly 
changing (Andrew, 2010). Or, in our terms, cinema is also constantly 
becoming and unbecoming – perhaps especially when formal techniques are 
married to the unbecoming behaviour of protagonists who themselves are in 
the process of unbecoming, or becoming-void, as happens to Oscar in Enter 
the Void. 
 
The Void 
Enter the Void thinks, via montrage and continuum, certain perspectives that 
can help us to rethink our place in the world, to help us unbecome, abandon 
the ego and show that we are fundamentally with others and the world. Like 
the profound, hilarious and temporally distorted drug experience, the film 
helps place us beside ourselves, inspire social-minded acts of kindness as we 
learn to see things from beyond our own perspective, and as part of society 
and the world. 
Deleuze always encourages us to see things anew, to challenge the 
limitations of our perceptions. Often this can lead to exhaustion, a state that 
can induce hallucinations, or false impressions (see Deleuze, 1995). In 
exhaustion, however, we are less capable of prejudice, and we let ourselves 
enter the flow of the universe, potentially freeing ourselves from 
anthropocentric vision. If the Tibetan Book of the Dead really is a guide for 
the living, helping us see the ‘between’ and that we are together in/with space, 
then so might Enter the Void also serve a similar ‘spiritual’ function. If we 
are with a world that itself might soon be exhausted, then the hallucinatory 
form of Enter the Void can help us to see and to think ‘with-ness,’ not only 
between ourselves and other humans, but between all that is life and all that 
appears woven from the void. 
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